An Airblue Airbus A320-200, registration AP-EDA performing flight PA-613 from Sharjah (United Arab Emirates) to Peshawar (Pakistan) with 150 people on board, landed on Peshawar's runway 35 at about 19:30L (14:30Z) with a delay of approximately 11 hours, however, veered temporarily to the right edge of the runway, veered back to the left edge of the runway, returned to the center line, in addition was unable to stop before the end of the runway (length 9000 feet/2740 meters) and overran the end of the runway. There were no injuries.
The airport was closed.
The airline confirmed the runway overrun and reported both engines were damaged in the occurrence.
ADS-B data show the aircraft stopped about 120 meters past the end of the runway, still on the paved surface of the runway end safety area.
On May 7th 2019 Pakistan's AIB reported the aircraft overran the end of runway 35 and collided with aircraft arresting barriers runway 17. The AIB is investigating the occurrence.
Pakistan's AIB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:
Involuntary Runway Excursion (RE).
Contributing Factors:
- Incorrect brake setting.
- Incorrect landing technique.
- Ineffective CRM.
The AIB analysed:
The aircraft flew the landing pattern as specified and was established on a 3 degrees Glide Slope in a stabilized approach on finals by 1,000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). The Captain disconnected the AP at 311 ft AGL. This allowed the Captain to take over the aircraft controls manually; however, speed was maintained through auto-thrust.
The landing speed was calculated to be 135 kt and speed target was set at 140 kt i.e. 5 kt above approach speed After the AP was disconnected, the aircraft pitch angle became shallow under manual control. As the aircraft approached the R/W Threshold, the wind direction also changed with the head wind component converting into a tail wind component thus increasing aircraft Ground Speed (GS) resulting in the aircraft diverging above the glide slope.
However, no effort was made by the PF to increase the Rate of Descent (ROD) by adjusting the pitch attitude. Instead of maintaining Glide Slope of 3 degrees, the Captain maintained a shallower aircraft attitude and thus shallower glide slope, as a result of which the aircraft crossed the Runway threshold at 66 ft AGL.
At BKIAP, Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights are available to assist the aircrew in maintaining the correct glide path for landing. Investigation into airfield landing aids and especially PAPIs also excluded any possibility of un-calibrated PAPI lights which might have caused the aircraft to maintain shallower than normal attitude on final approach.
Approaching a height of 20 ft above the R/W surface, the pitch attitude of the aircraft further shallowed thus reducing the ROD. This reduced ROD coupled with the tail wind component served to increase the float distance of the aircraft.
As a result of the long float, the aircraft landed at a distance of 4,448 ft from the threshold of R/W 35 (Main + Nose Landing Gears on runway surface).
As the length of the R/W is 9,000 ft, so the aircraft touched down almost halfway down the R/W with only 4,552 ft of R/W length remaining in which to stop the aircraft. The Captain selected thrust reversal on touchdown which, coupled with spoilers that had already been armed, became effective two seconds after touchdown. The indicated speed on touchdown was 141 kt with Ground Speed (GS) being 147 kt.
Despite crossing R/W threshold at higher height and even when the aircraft floated half of the R/W length, there was no attempt by the Captain to initiate a go around at any stage. Moreover, the FO, on observing the abnormality, also did not prompt the Captain to initiate a go around. Both these actions indicate lack of situational awareness on part of the Captain, and in-assertiveness as well as Crew Resource Management (CRM) failure on part of the FO.
As the aircraft was on finals during ILS pattern, the auto braking was armed and selected to LOW; however, as per the Cockpit crew Training Manual (FCTM), the use of Autobrake mode MEDIUM should be preferred for contaminated runways.
In conjunction with thrust reversers and spoilers, deceleration was initiated as soon as brakes were activated after touchdown; however, owing to late touchdown, wet runway surface and LOW autobraking selection, the deceleration proved to be insufficient. At a distance of 8,036 ft down the R/W (Speed 94 kt), the Captain initiated manual braking with maximum brake input coming in at 8,614 ft down the R/W at which time the anti-skid activated to prevent wheel jamming.
The wheel rotation for all wheels was uniform with no wheel jamming or hydroplaning on the wet R/W surface. This action of manual braking, however, also proved to be insufficient to stop the aircraft on the R/W as it was applied too late.
The aircraft being unable to stop on the R/W initially entered the paved surface and, after crossing over the barrier cables, came to rest 425 ft after the R/W threshold.
As the aircraft came to a stop, the Captain shut down the engines and the aircraft was then towed back to its parking position where all the passengers safely disembarked.
Related NOTAMs:
A0465/19 NOTAMN
Q) OPLR/QLEXX///A/000/999/
A) OPPS
B) 1904231552 C) 1904262359 EST
E) LOOP TWY (H AND J) EDGE LIGHTS AND 01 CIRCUIT
OF RWY EDGE LIGHTS ARE U/S DUE TECH.
A0464/19 NOTAMN
Q) OPLR/QMRXX////000/999/
A) OPPS
B) 1904231550 C) 1904262359 EST
E) MAIN RWY NOT AVAILABLE.
Metars:
OPPS 231600Z 23014KT 4000 VCTS FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 21/19 Q1011=
OPPS 231500Z 18022KT 4000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN090 21/19 Q1012=
OPPS 231430Z 31018KT 4000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN090 23/17 Q1012=
OPPS 231400Z 31018KT 4000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN090 23/17 Q1012=
OPPS 231330Z 23016KT 4000 TS FEW035CB SCT035 BKN100 23/17 Q1009=
OPPS 231300Z 23016KT 4000 TS FEW035CB SCT035 BKN100 23/17 Q1009=
OPPS 231230Z 13010KT 6000 -TSRA FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 25/12 Q1009=
OPPS 231200Z 13010KT 6000 -TSRA FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 25/12 Q1009=
OPPS 231130Z 05010KT 6000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 25/13 Q1009=
OPPS 231100Z 05010KT 6000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN100 25/13 Q1009=
OPPS 231030Z 36018KT 6000 TSRA FEW035 SCT035 SCT040 BKN100 24/13 Q1009=
Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
The airport was closed.
The airline confirmed the runway overrun and reported both engines were damaged in the occurrence.
ADS-B data show the aircraft stopped about 120 meters past the end of the runway, still on the paved surface of the runway end safety area.
On May 7th 2019 Pakistan's AIB reported the aircraft overran the end of runway 35 and collided with aircraft arresting barriers runway 17. The AIB is investigating the occurrence.
Pakistan's AIB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:
Involuntary Runway Excursion (RE).
Contributing Factors:
- Incorrect brake setting.
- Incorrect landing technique.
- Ineffective CRM.
The AIB analysed:
The aircraft flew the landing pattern as specified and was established on a 3 degrees Glide Slope in a stabilized approach on finals by 1,000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). The Captain disconnected the AP at 311 ft AGL. This allowed the Captain to take over the aircraft controls manually; however, speed was maintained through auto-thrust.
The landing speed was calculated to be 135 kt and speed target was set at 140 kt i.e. 5 kt above approach speed After the AP was disconnected, the aircraft pitch angle became shallow under manual control. As the aircraft approached the R/W Threshold, the wind direction also changed with the head wind component converting into a tail wind component thus increasing aircraft Ground Speed (GS) resulting in the aircraft diverging above the glide slope.
However, no effort was made by the PF to increase the Rate of Descent (ROD) by adjusting the pitch attitude. Instead of maintaining Glide Slope of 3 degrees, the Captain maintained a shallower aircraft attitude and thus shallower glide slope, as a result of which the aircraft crossed the Runway threshold at 66 ft AGL.
At BKIAP, Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights are available to assist the aircrew in maintaining the correct glide path for landing. Investigation into airfield landing aids and especially PAPIs also excluded any possibility of un-calibrated PAPI lights which might have caused the aircraft to maintain shallower than normal attitude on final approach.
Approaching a height of 20 ft above the R/W surface, the pitch attitude of the aircraft further shallowed thus reducing the ROD. This reduced ROD coupled with the tail wind component served to increase the float distance of the aircraft.
As a result of the long float, the aircraft landed at a distance of 4,448 ft from the threshold of R/W 35 (Main + Nose Landing Gears on runway surface).
As the length of the R/W is 9,000 ft, so the aircraft touched down almost halfway down the R/W with only 4,552 ft of R/W length remaining in which to stop the aircraft. The Captain selected thrust reversal on touchdown which, coupled with spoilers that had already been armed, became effective two seconds after touchdown. The indicated speed on touchdown was 141 kt with Ground Speed (GS) being 147 kt.
Despite crossing R/W threshold at higher height and even when the aircraft floated half of the R/W length, there was no attempt by the Captain to initiate a go around at any stage. Moreover, the FO, on observing the abnormality, also did not prompt the Captain to initiate a go around. Both these actions indicate lack of situational awareness on part of the Captain, and in-assertiveness as well as Crew Resource Management (CRM) failure on part of the FO.
As the aircraft was on finals during ILS pattern, the auto braking was armed and selected to LOW; however, as per the Cockpit crew Training Manual (FCTM), the use of Autobrake mode MEDIUM should be preferred for contaminated runways.
In conjunction with thrust reversers and spoilers, deceleration was initiated as soon as brakes were activated after touchdown; however, owing to late touchdown, wet runway surface and LOW autobraking selection, the deceleration proved to be insufficient. At a distance of 8,036 ft down the R/W (Speed 94 kt), the Captain initiated manual braking with maximum brake input coming in at 8,614 ft down the R/W at which time the anti-skid activated to prevent wheel jamming.
The wheel rotation for all wheels was uniform with no wheel jamming or hydroplaning on the wet R/W surface. This action of manual braking, however, also proved to be insufficient to stop the aircraft on the R/W as it was applied too late.
The aircraft being unable to stop on the R/W initially entered the paved surface and, after crossing over the barrier cables, came to rest 425 ft after the R/W threshold.
As the aircraft came to a stop, the Captain shut down the engines and the aircraft was then towed back to its parking position where all the passengers safely disembarked.
Related NOTAMs:
A0465/19 NOTAMN
Q) OPLR/QLEXX///A/000/999/
A) OPPS
B) 1904231552 C) 1904262359 EST
E) LOOP TWY (H AND J) EDGE LIGHTS AND 01 CIRCUIT
OF RWY EDGE LIGHTS ARE U/S DUE TECH.
A0464/19 NOTAMN
Q) OPLR/QMRXX////000/999/
A) OPPS
B) 1904231550 C) 1904262359 EST
E) MAIN RWY NOT AVAILABLE.
Metars:
OPPS 231600Z 23014KT 4000 VCTS FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 21/19 Q1011=
OPPS 231500Z 18022KT 4000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN090 21/19 Q1012=
OPPS 231430Z 31018KT 4000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN090 23/17 Q1012=
OPPS 231400Z 31018KT 4000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN090 23/17 Q1012=
OPPS 231330Z 23016KT 4000 TS FEW035CB SCT035 BKN100 23/17 Q1009=
OPPS 231300Z 23016KT 4000 TS FEW035CB SCT035 BKN100 23/17 Q1009=
OPPS 231230Z 13010KT 6000 -TSRA FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 25/12 Q1009=
OPPS 231200Z 13010KT 6000 -TSRA FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 25/12 Q1009=
OPPS 231130Z 05010KT 6000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT040 BKN100 25/13 Q1009=
OPPS 231100Z 05010KT 6000 TSRA FEW035CB SCT035 BKN100 25/13 Q1009=
OPPS 231030Z 36018KT 6000 TSRA FEW035 SCT035 SCT040 BKN100 24/13 Q1009=
Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):
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