An ANA All Nippon Airways Boeing 787-9, registration JA873A performing flight NH-114 from Tokyo Haneda (Japan) to Houston Intercontinental,TX (USA) with 197 passengers and 12 crew, landed on Houston's runway 26L at 07:53L (13:52Z), the tail however contacted the runway surface. The aircraft rolled out without further incident and taxied to the apron.
The aircraft is still on the ground in Houston as of May 8th 2026.
The airline confirmed the tail strike and reported, the occurrence was rated an accident by the NTSB and Japan's JTSB, an investigation is underway. Repair works are in progress.
According to information The Aviation Herald received the aircraft was performing an autoland.
On Sep 9th 2026 the NTSB released their final report and investigation docket concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
The captains inadvertent activation of the takeoff/go around switch at touchdown that caused an increase in the airplane pitch attitude that was not corrected before the lower fuselage contacted the runway.
The NTSB analysed:
At the time of the accident, the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. According to the flight crew, the visibility at IAH was forecast to be poor due to fog. Based on the conditions at IAH, the flight crew elected to perform a Category III (CAT III) approach and landing using the airplanes autoland system. The flight crew recalled no issues during the approach. When the airplane touched down, the captain stated he confirmed the engine thrust levers were at full idle. The captain recalled the speedbrakes deployed, and as he moved to raise the thrust reversers, he noted that the nose of the airplane rose unexpectedly. The captain manually pushed the control column forward with enough force to both disconnect the autopilot and lower the nose, but pulled the column back to prevent the nose landing gear from slamming down. The FO recalled the touchdown was smooth and recognized the speedbrakes had deployed. The FO was looking at the flight mode annunciator (FMA), located at the top on the primary flight display (PFD), and called out that the system entered takeoff/go around (TOGA) mode. The FO recalled the three fields for the FMA showed the following from left to right: 1) a blank field, 2) TOGA, and 3) TOGA. The captain and FO did not recall the TOGA switch was pressed. The flight crew recalled the pitch attitude rose to about 7.5° on the PFD. The flight crew did not recall any further issues during the remainder of the landing roll.
While exiting the runway, the captain recalled seeing a tailstrike message on the engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS). Postlanding inspection of the airplane confirmed substantial damage to the lower fuselage consistent with its contact with the runway. Additionally, scraping damage was found on the tailstrike sensor and on an antenna on the lower fuselage. There was no reported mechanical malfunction that contributed to the excessive airplane pitch angle after the airplane touched down.
The recorded flight data showed that the autopilot pitch mode and autothrottle mode were both in flare mode at the time the airplane touched down on the runway. About half a second after touchdown, the flight data showed the TOGA switch was pressed. As a result, the autopilot pitch and autothrottle modes both transitioned to TOGA mode. However, the autothrottle TOGA mode was canceled when the throttles were moved to reverse thrust. The autopilot pitch mode, still in TOGA mode, commanded the elevator and stabilizer to target a go-around pitch attitude, with the pitch attitude increasing from 3.5° to 7.4° over 2 seconds.
About 5 seconds after TOGA mode was activated, the control column was pushed forward (airplane nose down) and 2 seconds later showed a peak control column force of 40 pounds, which disconnected the autopilot. At that time, the airplane pitch attitude reached 7.8°, sufficient to result in a tailstrike, with a subsequent peak value of 7.9°. The flight data also showed the tailstrike protection function had activated and was commanding an elevator deflection, after the TOGA switch was pressed, to reduce elevator deflection. However, the tailstrike protection function could not prevent the pitch attitude increase that resulted in the tailstrike due to its limited authority.
According to flight crew statements, they did not recall pressing the TOGA switch and did not believe they pressed them. There was no evidence of an autopilot system malfunction, therefore it is likely the captain inadvertently pressed the TOGA switch when he reached for the thrust reversers at touchdown. According to the airplane manufacturer, the conditions that inhibit TOGA activation were not yet satisfied when the TOGA switch was pressed, allowing for both the autopilot pitch mode and autothrottle mode to transition to TOGA. The flight crew was unaware that TOGA mode was activated, and their delayed detection of the increase in pitch attitude prevented timely application of corrective pitch control inputs to avert the tailstrike.
https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ANA114/history/20260227/0200Z/RJTT/KIAH
Metars:
KIAH 271453Z 02008KT 7SM CLR 18/18 A3000 RMK AO2 SLP159 T01830178 51023=
KIAH 271417Z 04004KT 3SM BR SCT002 17/17 A2999 RMK AO2 T01720172=
KIAH 271407Z 02003KT 1SM BR BKN002 BKN013 17/17 A2999 RMK AO2 T01720172=
KIAH 271353Z 36004KT 1/4SM FG VV002 17/17 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP154 T01670167=
KIAH 271319Z VRB03KT 1/8SM FG VV001 17/17 A2997 RMK AO2 T01670167=
KIAH 271253Z 35003KT 1/4SM FG OVC002 16/16 A2996 RMK AO2 SLP144 T01610161=
KIAH 271153Z 35003KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 17/17 A2993 RMK AO2 SLP136 T01670167 10189 20161 53012=
KIAH 271053Z 00000KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 17/17 A2992 RMK AO2 SLP131 T01720172=
KIAH 271042Z 00000KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 17/17 A2991 RMK AO2 T01720172=
KIAH 271018Z 00000KT 1 1/2SM BR OVC002 17/17 A2991 RMK AO2 VIS N-E 1/2 T01720172=
KIAH 270953Z 00000KT 2SM BR BKN007 OVC015 18/18 A2990 RMK AO2 SLP125 T01780178=
The aircraft is still on the ground in Houston as of May 8th 2026.
The airline confirmed the tail strike and reported, the occurrence was rated an accident by the NTSB and Japan's JTSB, an investigation is underway. Repair works are in progress.
According to information The Aviation Herald received the aircraft was performing an autoland.
On Sep 9th 2026 the NTSB released their final report and investigation docket concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
The captains inadvertent activation of the takeoff/go around switch at touchdown that caused an increase in the airplane pitch attitude that was not corrected before the lower fuselage contacted the runway.
The NTSB analysed:
At the time of the accident, the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer (FO) was the pilot monitoring. According to the flight crew, the visibility at IAH was forecast to be poor due to fog. Based on the conditions at IAH, the flight crew elected to perform a Category III (CAT III) approach and landing using the airplanes autoland system. The flight crew recalled no issues during the approach. When the airplane touched down, the captain stated he confirmed the engine thrust levers were at full idle. The captain recalled the speedbrakes deployed, and as he moved to raise the thrust reversers, he noted that the nose of the airplane rose unexpectedly. The captain manually pushed the control column forward with enough force to both disconnect the autopilot and lower the nose, but pulled the column back to prevent the nose landing gear from slamming down. The FO recalled the touchdown was smooth and recognized the speedbrakes had deployed. The FO was looking at the flight mode annunciator (FMA), located at the top on the primary flight display (PFD), and called out that the system entered takeoff/go around (TOGA) mode. The FO recalled the three fields for the FMA showed the following from left to right: 1) a blank field, 2) TOGA, and 3) TOGA. The captain and FO did not recall the TOGA switch was pressed. The flight crew recalled the pitch attitude rose to about 7.5° on the PFD. The flight crew did not recall any further issues during the remainder of the landing roll.
While exiting the runway, the captain recalled seeing a tailstrike message on the engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS). Postlanding inspection of the airplane confirmed substantial damage to the lower fuselage consistent with its contact with the runway. Additionally, scraping damage was found on the tailstrike sensor and on an antenna on the lower fuselage. There was no reported mechanical malfunction that contributed to the excessive airplane pitch angle after the airplane touched down.
The recorded flight data showed that the autopilot pitch mode and autothrottle mode were both in flare mode at the time the airplane touched down on the runway. About half a second after touchdown, the flight data showed the TOGA switch was pressed. As a result, the autopilot pitch and autothrottle modes both transitioned to TOGA mode. However, the autothrottle TOGA mode was canceled when the throttles were moved to reverse thrust. The autopilot pitch mode, still in TOGA mode, commanded the elevator and stabilizer to target a go-around pitch attitude, with the pitch attitude increasing from 3.5° to 7.4° over 2 seconds.
About 5 seconds after TOGA mode was activated, the control column was pushed forward (airplane nose down) and 2 seconds later showed a peak control column force of 40 pounds, which disconnected the autopilot. At that time, the airplane pitch attitude reached 7.8°, sufficient to result in a tailstrike, with a subsequent peak value of 7.9°. The flight data also showed the tailstrike protection function had activated and was commanding an elevator deflection, after the TOGA switch was pressed, to reduce elevator deflection. However, the tailstrike protection function could not prevent the pitch attitude increase that resulted in the tailstrike due to its limited authority.
According to flight crew statements, they did not recall pressing the TOGA switch and did not believe they pressed them. There was no evidence of an autopilot system malfunction, therefore it is likely the captain inadvertently pressed the TOGA switch when he reached for the thrust reversers at touchdown. According to the airplane manufacturer, the conditions that inhibit TOGA activation were not yet satisfied when the TOGA switch was pressed, allowing for both the autopilot pitch mode and autothrottle mode to transition to TOGA. The flight crew was unaware that TOGA mode was activated, and their delayed detection of the increase in pitch attitude prevented timely application of corrective pitch control inputs to avert the tailstrike.
https://flightaware.com/live/flight/ANA114/history/20260227/0200Z/RJTT/KIAH
Metars:
KIAH 271453Z 02008KT 7SM CLR 18/18 A3000 RMK AO2 SLP159 T01830178 51023=
KIAH 271417Z 04004KT 3SM BR SCT002 17/17 A2999 RMK AO2 T01720172=
KIAH 271407Z 02003KT 1SM BR BKN002 BKN013 17/17 A2999 RMK AO2 T01720172=
KIAH 271353Z 36004KT 1/4SM FG VV002 17/17 A2999 RMK AO2 SLP154 T01670167=
KIAH 271319Z VRB03KT 1/8SM FG VV001 17/17 A2997 RMK AO2 T01670167=
KIAH 271253Z 35003KT 1/4SM FG OVC002 16/16 A2996 RMK AO2 SLP144 T01610161=
KIAH 271153Z 35003KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 17/17 A2993 RMK AO2 SLP136 T01670167 10189 20161 53012=
KIAH 271053Z 00000KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 17/17 A2992 RMK AO2 SLP131 T01720172=
KIAH 271042Z 00000KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 17/17 A2991 RMK AO2 T01720172=
KIAH 271018Z 00000KT 1 1/2SM BR OVC002 17/17 A2991 RMK AO2 VIS N-E 1/2 T01720172=
KIAH 270953Z 00000KT 2SM BR BKN007 OVC015 18/18 A2990 RMK AO2 SLP125 T01780178=
This article is published under license. Article Source
Published Date
