An Air India Express Boeing 737-8 MAX, registration VT-BXL performing flight IX-1109 from Goa to Delhi (India) with 165 passengers and 6 crew, was taxiing for departure when the aircraft entered the runway without clearance to backtrack for takeoff from runway 08. A fighter jet at this moment taking off runway 08 managed to get airborne and overfly the Boeing.
On Oct 31st 2026 India's AAIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
- The R/T call of Expect back track by SMC controller was misinterpreted by the PF as enter backtrack clearance, resulting in the crews cognitive focus to shift entirely toward executing the Runway entry, without seeking an explicit clearance. Failing to request clarification may have likely caused the PIC to believe erroneously that they have received an expected clearance to enter Runway.
- The flight crew did not fully adhere to the SMC Controllers taxi instructions to hold at holding point and to contact Navy- Approach on 119.7 MHz at the holding point. Had they stopped and established positive communication with the Navy- ATC before entering the active runway, the incident could have been avoided.
Contributory factors:
- The PM, being a trainee, was overly-reliant on the instructor and followed instructions without any hesitation. He got busy with heads down tasks after the taxi holding point trying to verify the values for RWY 08 take-off on the active runway due to which he was unable to monitor the R/T calls effectively; neither did the PM caution the PF from an unauthorized entry.
- Hear back error by the SMC controller: If the SMC controller had insisted on a correct readback, read back error by the captain and hear-back error by the SMC with regard to a crucial R/T call hold at holding point, could have prevented the serious incident.
The AAIB summarized the sequence of events:
On 03 Apr 2026 at 0237 UTC, Air India Express flight AXB-1109, operating from Dabolim Airport, South GOA to Delhi was given startup and pushback clearance for RWY 26 departure by the SMC controller. The aircraft was informed that the runway has changed to RWY 08 and to expect a backtrack just prior to taxi. The aircraft was then instructed by the SMC controller to Taxi via N2, hold at holding point RWY 08. The Aircraft acknowledged this call as Taxi via N2 for RWY 08.
After issuing departure clearance during taxi, the SMC controller asked AXB-1109 to change frequency to ATC approach on 119.7MHz which was readback by the aircraft suffixed by the R/T entering runway. This call was not acknowledged by the SMC Controller. The aircraft continued to taxi without establishing two-way on the said frequency. At the same time, a Navy fighter aircraft was issued takeoff clearance by the ATC tower controller and started rolling on RWY 08. The departing Navy aircraft was informed by the ATC Tower controller that an unidentified aircraft has entered runway. The Navy Aircraft acknowledged the call and executed lift- off abeam N5 RWY 08 while AXB-1109 continued backtracking for RWY 08.
After the occurrence, AXB-1109 re-established two-way contact with SMC Controller. There was a brief confusion on the frequency between the aircraft and SMC controller, after which it was changed over to ATC approach frequency 119.7MHz. The approach controller advised the aircraft to vacate via N6 TWY and hold at TWY N5 holding point to accommodate the departure of another Navy fighter that was in formation with the preceding Navy aircraft. AXB-1109 was then, instructed to contact Tower frequency on 118.1MHz and subsequently to SMC frequency 121.95MHz on vacating the runway, after which the confusion about the occurrence was discussed on SMC frequency again.
After the takeoff of the second Navy aircraft, AXB-1109 was cleared to enter runway by the Tower controller and takeoff from RWY 08. The take-off and flight, post occurrence was uneventful and AXB 1109 landed safely at Delhi airport. The pilot of AXB-1109 had reported the occurrence to Air India Express Safety department after the flight and the Naval ATC officials had reported the event to Naval Headquarters, DNAS, which further forwarded the occurrence to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau.
On Oct 31st 2026 India's AAIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
- The R/T call of Expect back track by SMC controller was misinterpreted by the PF as enter backtrack clearance, resulting in the crews cognitive focus to shift entirely toward executing the Runway entry, without seeking an explicit clearance. Failing to request clarification may have likely caused the PIC to believe erroneously that they have received an expected clearance to enter Runway.
- The flight crew did not fully adhere to the SMC Controllers taxi instructions to hold at holding point and to contact Navy- Approach on 119.7 MHz at the holding point. Had they stopped and established positive communication with the Navy- ATC before entering the active runway, the incident could have been avoided.
Contributory factors:
- The PM, being a trainee, was overly-reliant on the instructor and followed instructions without any hesitation. He got busy with heads down tasks after the taxi holding point trying to verify the values for RWY 08 take-off on the active runway due to which he was unable to monitor the R/T calls effectively; neither did the PM caution the PF from an unauthorized entry.
- Hear back error by the SMC controller: If the SMC controller had insisted on a correct readback, read back error by the captain and hear-back error by the SMC with regard to a crucial R/T call hold at holding point, could have prevented the serious incident.
The AAIB summarized the sequence of events:
On 03 Apr 2026 at 0237 UTC, Air India Express flight AXB-1109, operating from Dabolim Airport, South GOA to Delhi was given startup and pushback clearance for RWY 26 departure by the SMC controller. The aircraft was informed that the runway has changed to RWY 08 and to expect a backtrack just prior to taxi. The aircraft was then instructed by the SMC controller to Taxi via N2, hold at holding point RWY 08. The Aircraft acknowledged this call as Taxi via N2 for RWY 08.
After issuing departure clearance during taxi, the SMC controller asked AXB-1109 to change frequency to ATC approach on 119.7MHz which was readback by the aircraft suffixed by the R/T entering runway. This call was not acknowledged by the SMC Controller. The aircraft continued to taxi without establishing two-way on the said frequency. At the same time, a Navy fighter aircraft was issued takeoff clearance by the ATC tower controller and started rolling on RWY 08. The departing Navy aircraft was informed by the ATC Tower controller that an unidentified aircraft has entered runway. The Navy Aircraft acknowledged the call and executed lift- off abeam N5 RWY 08 while AXB-1109 continued backtracking for RWY 08.
After the occurrence, AXB-1109 re-established two-way contact with SMC Controller. There was a brief confusion on the frequency between the aircraft and SMC controller, after which it was changed over to ATC approach frequency 119.7MHz. The approach controller advised the aircraft to vacate via N6 TWY and hold at TWY N5 holding point to accommodate the departure of another Navy fighter that was in formation with the preceding Navy aircraft. AXB-1109 was then, instructed to contact Tower frequency on 118.1MHz and subsequently to SMC frequency 121.95MHz on vacating the runway, after which the confusion about the occurrence was discussed on SMC frequency again.
After the takeoff of the second Navy aircraft, AXB-1109 was cleared to enter runway by the Tower controller and takeoff from RWY 08. The take-off and flight, post occurrence was uneventful and AXB 1109 landed safely at Delhi airport. The pilot of AXB-1109 had reported the occurrence to Air India Express Safety department after the flight and the Naval ATC officials had reported the event to Naval Headquarters, DNAS, which further forwarded the occurrence to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau.
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