A TUI Airways Boeing 737-800, registration G-TAWB performing flight BY-7719 from East Midlands,EN (UK) to Arrecife,CI (Spain) with 125 passengers and 6 crew, was preparing for departure, the door was to be closed when the stairs were already moved away from the aircraft. The lead flight attendant while attempting to close the door could not stop herself falling into the gap between door and stairs, fell onto the tarmac and received serious injuries. The flight was cancelled.
On Sep 25th 2025 the AAIB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
The SCCM fell from steps as they were pulled away before the aircraft door was closed and the steps vacated. She suffered serious injuries in the fall.
The step removal process was conducted in a way that was not consistent with the written policy and had insufficient safeguards to prevent movement of the steps with people on them or the door still open. This procedural workaround had been used by the staff at the ground handling company for many years at East Midlands and at many other airports in the UK.
The presence of a dispatcher at the bottom on the steps releasing the stabilisers triggered the steps to be moved without an effective check or confirmation that the door was closed and the steps were vacated. The presence of multiple dispatchers, without the ramp team knowing who the official dispatcher was, set the conditions for this event to occur. The step removal procedure required that the ramp staff check that there were no personnel on the steps before the stabilisers were retracted but the procedures did not specify how this was to be performed nor who was responsible for it.
On Sep 25th 2025 the AAIB released their final report concluding the probable cause of the accident was:
The SCCM fell from steps as they were pulled away before the aircraft door was closed and the steps vacated. She suffered serious injuries in the fall.
The step removal process was conducted in a way that was not consistent with the written policy and had insufficient safeguards to prevent movement of the steps with people on them or the door still open. This procedural workaround had been used by the staff at the ground handling company for many years at East Midlands and at many other airports in the UK.
The presence of a dispatcher at the bottom on the steps releasing the stabilisers triggered the steps to be moved without an effective check or confirmation that the door was closed and the steps were vacated. The presence of multiple dispatchers, without the ramp team knowing who the official dispatcher was, set the conditions for this event to occur. The step removal procedure required that the ramp staff check that there were no personnel on the steps before the stabilisers were retracted but the procedures did not specify how this was to be performed nor who was responsible for it.
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