A Finnair Oyji Avions de Transport Regional ATR-72-212A, registration OH-ATM performing flight AY-482 from Kuusamo to Helsinki (Finland), completed an uneventful flight with a safe landing on Helsinki's runway 15 and taxied to the apron. During disembarkation a passenger leaned on the handrail, which collapsed. The passenger fell face down onto the tarmac and sustained serious injuries.
Finland's Onnettomuustutkintakeskus rated the occurrence an accident and opened an investigation.
The aircraft continued service on schedule.
On Oct 2nd 2025 Finland's Onnettomuustutkintakeskus released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
1. The location of the quick release pin, or any other solution based on visual observation, does not draw adequate attention to the locked or unlocked condition of the collapsible handrail. An unlocked handrail may inadvertently remain upright during door opening. Conclusion: The handrail mechanism has design deficiencies in terms of technical solutions, operability and conceptual ergonomics. These defects may lead to a situation where the unlocked condition may go unnoticed.
2. The purser opened the door in an environment that may have affected concentration. Cross-checks by another crew member or other safeguards were not in place to guard against the effects of a human lapse. Conclusion: The door opening procedure and related instructions were inadequate from a safety management viewpoint.
3. Norra had experienced a similar event in previous January. As a result, the company had increased communication on correct door operation and improved training. In June, a similar lapse that did not result in injuries was reported. No further action was taken. Conclusion: The companys safety management policy did not respond adequately to a safety hazard that had been recognized in conjunction with isolated occurrences. Insufficient attention was paid on the implementation and follow-up of corrective actions.
4. The Cabin Attendant Manual did not contain an alerting procedure in a case where the airplane is parked. Conclusion: First response units were not alerted in accordance with the aerodrome emergency plan. The airplanes crew and airport ground staff assumed that the plan is not applicable to a parked airplane, and the emergency call was therefore made via several intermediaries. Because the call was not made from the immediate vicinity of the person involved, the caller was not in a position to answer clarifying questions and receive instructions for the administration of medical care.
5. The need of psychosocial support to the injured passenger was not evaluated. Guidelines on psychosocial support arrangements to organizations and operators in the event of aviation accidents are available but their focus is on major accidents. Conclusion: A minor aviation accident, incident or hazardous situation will not necessarily initiate appropriate psychosocial support arrangements.
6. Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom received the report of Norras internal investigation in January 2024 and considered the safety recommendations contained therein sufficient. Neither did the preliminary SIAF report of the accident lead to effective action. In July, Traficom received a report of the incident at Vaasa but did not request Norra to take action. Conclusion: The competent authority did not take timely action to maintain the level of safety. The operators responsibility for the safety of its activities was based on excessive trust bestowed on it by the authority, which meant that the authority presumed that corrective actions would be taken without active supervision and involvement on the authority's part.
Finland's Onnettomuustutkintakeskus rated the occurrence an accident and opened an investigation.
The aircraft continued service on schedule.
On Oct 2nd 2025 Finland's Onnettomuustutkintakeskus released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
1. The location of the quick release pin, or any other solution based on visual observation, does not draw adequate attention to the locked or unlocked condition of the collapsible handrail. An unlocked handrail may inadvertently remain upright during door opening. Conclusion: The handrail mechanism has design deficiencies in terms of technical solutions, operability and conceptual ergonomics. These defects may lead to a situation where the unlocked condition may go unnoticed.
2. The purser opened the door in an environment that may have affected concentration. Cross-checks by another crew member or other safeguards were not in place to guard against the effects of a human lapse. Conclusion: The door opening procedure and related instructions were inadequate from a safety management viewpoint.
3. Norra had experienced a similar event in previous January. As a result, the company had increased communication on correct door operation and improved training. In June, a similar lapse that did not result in injuries was reported. No further action was taken. Conclusion: The companys safety management policy did not respond adequately to a safety hazard that had been recognized in conjunction with isolated occurrences. Insufficient attention was paid on the implementation and follow-up of corrective actions.
4. The Cabin Attendant Manual did not contain an alerting procedure in a case where the airplane is parked. Conclusion: First response units were not alerted in accordance with the aerodrome emergency plan. The airplanes crew and airport ground staff assumed that the plan is not applicable to a parked airplane, and the emergency call was therefore made via several intermediaries. Because the call was not made from the immediate vicinity of the person involved, the caller was not in a position to answer clarifying questions and receive instructions for the administration of medical care.
5. The need of psychosocial support to the injured passenger was not evaluated. Guidelines on psychosocial support arrangements to organizations and operators in the event of aviation accidents are available but their focus is on major accidents. Conclusion: A minor aviation accident, incident or hazardous situation will not necessarily initiate appropriate psychosocial support arrangements.
6. Finnish Transport and Communications Agency Traficom received the report of Norras internal investigation in January 2024 and considered the safety recommendations contained therein sufficient. Neither did the preliminary SIAF report of the accident lead to effective action. In July, Traficom received a report of the incident at Vaasa but did not request Norra to take action. Conclusion: The competent authority did not take timely action to maintain the level of safety. The operators responsibility for the safety of its activities was based on excessive trust bestowed on it by the authority, which meant that the authority presumed that corrective actions would be taken without active supervision and involvement on the authority's part.
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