An Easyjet Switzerland Airbus A320-200N, registration HB-AYE performing flight U2-1355 from Geneva (Switzerland) to Las Palmas,CI (Spain) with 133 passengers and 6 crew, was on approach to Las Palmas' runway 03L when a formation of four military F16 aircraft was cleared for takeoff from runway 03R. Subsequently a loss of separation occurred between the aircraft. The A20N continued for a safe landing.
Spain's CIAIAC rated the occurrence a serious incident, opened an investigation and reported:
While on approach to runway 03L of the aforementioned Las Palmas Airport GCLP, a formation of four F16 military aircraft (PROTE75) was authorized to take off from runway 03R.
The takeoff of the first three F16 military aircraft occurred when the aircraft with call sign EZS1355 was in the final stretch of the approach, very close to the threshold, coinciding during the landing with the third of the military aircraft, which was taking off in parallel, at the same time.
This circumstance caused a loss of separation between both aircraft, since the regulations do not allow simultaneous operation on the two runways of that airport, due to the distance between their axes.
The fourth military aircraft did not take off and remained stopped at the head of runway 03R, so there was also a loss of separation with it.
ON Jul 17th 2026 Spain's CIAIAC released their final">https://www.transportes.gob.es/recursos_mfom/comodin/recursos/2025-030-in_final-report_nm.pdf">final report concluding the probable cause of the incident was:
The investigation has determined that the loss of separation was caused by an unforeseen delay during take-off of the fourth LOCKHEED MARTIN F16 FIGHTING FALCON and that the controller made the least safety-compromising decision not to abort the landing of the AIRBUS A320 and to allow the military aircraft to continue the take-off, because he made a correct situational assessment and was in control of the situation at all times.
The CIAIAC analysed:
In the case at hand, there was no loss of separation due to the execution of an erroneous manoeuvre by the crew of the commercial aircraft, nor because the controller miscalculated the times, as he gave the AIRBUS A320 a late landing clearance instruction because he was aware of the delay of the last LOCKHEED MARTIN F16 FIGHTING FALCON in relation to its three companions, because when the first of them was already in the air and the second on the take-off run he had already realised that the fourth had not yet arrived at the holding point on runway 03R.
The LOCKHEED MARTIN F16 FIGHTING FALCON had a slight delay when taking off in formation and the controller decided to maintain the landing of the AIRBUS as the safest option, taking into account on one hand the difference in performance between the two aircraft and also that the loss of horizontal separation was due exclusively to the configuration of the runways and that they only coincided for a moment at the same altitude, which was when one was landing and the other taking off.
At the time one was decelerating to stop and the other was accelerating fully to take off.
The controller took into account the difference in size of the two aircraft and therefore the lack of influence that the wake of the military aircraft had on the civilian aircraft.
Had the crew of the AIRBUS been instructed to hold the landing as the military aircraft gained altitude during take-off, the vertical separation would have been less during the time they were both over the runway axis and the horizontal separation would have remained the same until the military aircraft, which had a higher speed, turned right.
Moreover, analysis of the communications between the controller and the aircraft involved shows that he kept the traffic informed at all times of their positions and that he was aware that the AIRBUS A320 was in sight of the military formation and that he was in visual contact with all of them.
It is also important to note that the pilot of the fourth military aircraft was not in contact with the tower local frequency (GCLP TWR) and did not have a flight plan call sign, so the controller could not contact him directly to instruct him to abort the take-off.
Finally, it should also be taken into account that the controller's decision was also influenced, albeit to a lesser extent, by the fact that there was another military formation of EUROFIGHTER TYPHOON aircraft, which were approaching the vertical of the airport at high speed, given that they were not going to land, but to pass over it, which was another element in consolidating the decision for the AIRBUS to continue with the landing.
It can be concluded that this was a minor incident, since the situation was common knowledge for both aircraft and the controller was aware of the manoeuvre of both aircraft, so the situational assessment he made was correct and he took the decisions that least compromised safety.
Spain's CIAIAC rated the occurrence a serious incident, opened an investigation and reported:
While on approach to runway 03L of the aforementioned Las Palmas Airport GCLP, a formation of four F16 military aircraft (PROTE75) was authorized to take off from runway 03R.
The takeoff of the first three F16 military aircraft occurred when the aircraft with call sign EZS1355 was in the final stretch of the approach, very close to the threshold, coinciding during the landing with the third of the military aircraft, which was taking off in parallel, at the same time.
This circumstance caused a loss of separation between both aircraft, since the regulations do not allow simultaneous operation on the two runways of that airport, due to the distance between their axes.
The fourth military aircraft did not take off and remained stopped at the head of runway 03R, so there was also a loss of separation with it.
ON Jul 17th 2026 Spain's CIAIAC released their final">https://www.transportes.gob.es/recursos_mfom/comodin/recursos/2025-030-in_final-report_nm.pdf">final report concluding the probable cause of the incident was:
The investigation has determined that the loss of separation was caused by an unforeseen delay during take-off of the fourth LOCKHEED MARTIN F16 FIGHTING FALCON and that the controller made the least safety-compromising decision not to abort the landing of the AIRBUS A320 and to allow the military aircraft to continue the take-off, because he made a correct situational assessment and was in control of the situation at all times.
The CIAIAC analysed:
In the case at hand, there was no loss of separation due to the execution of an erroneous manoeuvre by the crew of the commercial aircraft, nor because the controller miscalculated the times, as he gave the AIRBUS A320 a late landing clearance instruction because he was aware of the delay of the last LOCKHEED MARTIN F16 FIGHTING FALCON in relation to its three companions, because when the first of them was already in the air and the second on the take-off run he had already realised that the fourth had not yet arrived at the holding point on runway 03R.
The LOCKHEED MARTIN F16 FIGHTING FALCON had a slight delay when taking off in formation and the controller decided to maintain the landing of the AIRBUS as the safest option, taking into account on one hand the difference in performance between the two aircraft and also that the loss of horizontal separation was due exclusively to the configuration of the runways and that they only coincided for a moment at the same altitude, which was when one was landing and the other taking off.
At the time one was decelerating to stop and the other was accelerating fully to take off.
The controller took into account the difference in size of the two aircraft and therefore the lack of influence that the wake of the military aircraft had on the civilian aircraft.
Had the crew of the AIRBUS been instructed to hold the landing as the military aircraft gained altitude during take-off, the vertical separation would have been less during the time they were both over the runway axis and the horizontal separation would have remained the same until the military aircraft, which had a higher speed, turned right.
Moreover, analysis of the communications between the controller and the aircraft involved shows that he kept the traffic informed at all times of their positions and that he was aware that the AIRBUS A320 was in sight of the military formation and that he was in visual contact with all of them.
It is also important to note that the pilot of the fourth military aircraft was not in contact with the tower local frequency (GCLP TWR) and did not have a flight plan call sign, so the controller could not contact him directly to instruct him to abort the take-off.
Finally, it should also be taken into account that the controller's decision was also influenced, albeit to a lesser extent, by the fact that there was another military formation of EUROFIGHTER TYPHOON aircraft, which were approaching the vertical of the airport at high speed, given that they were not going to land, but to pass over it, which was another element in consolidating the decision for the AIRBUS to continue with the landing.
It can be concluded that this was a minor incident, since the situation was common knowledge for both aircraft and the controller was aware of the manoeuvre of both aircraft, so the situational assessment he made was correct and he took the decisions that least compromised safety.
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