A Varesh Airlines Boeing 737-300, registration EP-VAI performing flight VRH-6805 from Tehran Imam Khomeini (Iran) to Dushanbe (Tajikistan) with 106 passengers and 10 crew, landed on Dushanbe's runway 09 but overran the end of the runway and came to a stop with all gear on soft ground. There were no injuries, the aircraft sustained minor damage.
Iran's AAIB reported the investigation was delegated to Iran, the occurrence was rated a serious incident. The pilot in command, an instructor, was occupying the right hand seat and was pilot monitoring, the captain in the left hand seat was pilot flying. The AAIB summarized the sequence of events:
On 06:05:28 UTC, after contacting Approach Radar Controller, the flight was cleared to initiate ILS approach for RWY 09. By commencing the ILS approach, the cockpit crew experienced raining on final and the tower controller reported weather condition including the thunderstorm in the vicinity of the airport as an unusual weather phenomenon, despite, the cockpit crew continued the approach and after receiving gusting wind information, was cleared for landing on 06:08:39 UTC.
Pilot report shows: During landing flare, the visibility became poor as the runway edge lights were difficult to see due to heavy precipitation so, the captain (PF) experienced a long flare on the runway inadvertently. After landing, the thrust reversers were activated and maximum manual braking applied by the captain but the runway distance remaining was not sufficient for stopping and finally aircraft overran the runway end and a Runway Excursion occurred and came to rest in a grass-covered and muddy area beyond the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) while the empennage section was on the paved surface.
The AAIB described the damage:
- Nose landing gear tire burst;
- Damage to the external cowling of No.2 engine;
- Minor damage to the right main landing gear and the air-ground switch system; and
- Interring of mud and objects into the engines, landing gears, and the intake of cabin air system.
On Sep 17th 2025 Iran's AAIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
Following a thorough review and analysis of factual information, the main cause of this serious incident was determined to be human factor, specifically the captains incorrect decision to continue the approach under adverse weather conditions and the misjudgment of the remaining runway length required to stop the aircraft.
Contributing Factors
- ineffective pilot planning in defining responsibilities within company operations.
- weak control methods in the companys operational manual regarding the
classification of airports.
- Presence of severe weather phenomena, including thunderstorms, lightning, and heavy rainfall in the area
The AAIB analysed:
Pre-flight Planning by the Airline
- The operational management of Varesh Airlines had designated Flight 6805 as a two-pilot operation; but the crew composition and division of duties were not in accordance with the companys operational procedures. The flight was scheduled with a Commander who had no prior experience on this route, which was inconsistent with the operational procedures for a first-time flight on this route.
For the incident flight, the companys scheduling manager should have assigned First Officer as instructor pilot, for supervising, evaluating, and training the Commander during his first operation on the TehranDushanbe route.
- The operational responsible staff of the Airlines did not inform or make the flights First Officer (instructor pilot) aware of the Commanders lack of experience and unfamiliarity with the route from Imam Khomeini International Airport (OIIE) to Dushanbe International Airport (UTDD).
- Based on the General Declaration (crew list), the name of the First Officer (instructor pilot) appears at the top of the crew roster, while the name of the flights Commander is listed as second one. In the Operation Flight Plan (OFP) documents and the Dispatch Release Form, the instructor pilot is designated as the aircraft commander, who should have assumed responsibility for the flight and signed the aforementioned documents. However, the operation Department of Varesh Airlines assigned the flight responsibility to a pilot inexperienced on this route, who then signed these documents, despite not having undergone a route proficiency check from the departure airport (OIIE) to the destination airport (UTDD) and therefore not being authorized for the route as the Commander. This misassignment reduced the effectiveness of crew resource management (CRM) between the two pilots.
- The pre-flight briefing is a critical opportunity for sharing knowledge and awareness of specific flight conditions, including the characteristics of the destination airport, among the flight crew. Considering that the flight crew had been transported individually from their residences to Imam Khomeini International Airport, and that the Pilot-in-Command arrived so later on a separate transfer from the other crew members, an effective pre-flight briefing between the pilots and cabin crew was not conducted. The briefing was limited to the bus and inside the aircraft, and the instructor pilot did not have sufficient opportunity to convey the relevant operational experience regarding the destination airport (CAT B) to the Pilot-in-Command.
- According to the definitions stated in section 1.13.1.2, Category B aerodromes, on page 41 of Varesh Airlines Operations Manual (OM, Chapter One, Part C), the flight captain had not, prior to the flight on 9 April 2025, completed any route and aerodrome familiarization training for the route from the departure airport to the destination airport. Furthermore, he had not undergone a flight assessment by a Type Rating Instructor (TRI), and consequently, no training record had been issued.
- One of the key aspects of maintaining safety is ensuring the full readiness of pilots to operate flights to different airports, each with unique characteristics and complexities. Since Category B aerodromes have unusual features or complexities that require greater pilot awareness and preparation, the companys operational procedures specify that relying solely on self-study for a pilot flying to such airports for the first time, especially in the role of PIC, poses a safety risk.
Flight Commander & Pilot Flying
- Prior to the flight on 10 April 2025, the commander had never flown the route. The captain had been informed and aware of the flight schedule prior to 10 April 2025; however, he did not report his unfitness to accept the responsibility as Pilot-in-Command to any of Varesh Airlines responsible.
- Despite adverse meteorological conditions reported by the destination tower on forecast thunderstorms and lightning in the airport vicinity, and the TAF predicting cumulonimbus clouds, gusty winds of 1424 knots, and heavy rainfall, the commander continued the approach instead of initiating a missed approach. Pilot statements confirmed that the severe weather caused reduced visibility on final approach, delaying runway acquisition.
- Due to the gusty wind, the commander increased the approach speed by 10 knots above the computed approach speed plus the standard gust correction (VREF + 5 + 10 knots). Encountering non-standard weather phenomena, the commander had inadequate visibility of the runway threshold and edge lights, but still continued the landing attempt. After crossing the runway threshold, the aircraft experienced a long flare, consuming over half of the runway before touchdown. After passing taxiway D on a wet runway, despite both pilots applying maximum braking, the aircraft was unable to stop and overran the runway, coming to rest in a grass- and mud-covered area beyond the end of the strip.
- In accordance with the aircrafts Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the autothrottle should be disengaged 12 NM from the runway or at 300600 feet AGL to permit manual thrust control during landing. In this event, the commander failed to disengage the autothrottle until touchdown.
Note: When a manual landing is planned from an approach with the autopilot engaged, the transition to manual flight should be planned early enough to allow the pilot time to establish airplane control before beginning the flare.
- If the pilot, due to reduced visibility caused by meteorological conditions, is unable to identify the runway edge lightswhich indicate the longitudinal and lateral limits of the runway at night and particularly in low visibilityor other runway visual aids, this reflects an unsafe level of visibility for continuing the landing. The most important pilot action in case of loss of visual reference during the final stages of approach is to execute a Go-Around, which was not performed by the pilot. The pilots justification was limited to not having encountered adverse meteorological phenomena and attributing the approach limitations solely to natural obstacles after a potential go-around.
First Officer (F/O) and Type Rating Instructor (TRI)
- The flights First Officer, holding a Boeing 737 Type Rating Instructor (TRI) certificate No. FCL.905.TRI (a), (d, 1, 2) dated 13 March 2025, issued by IR Iran Civil Aviation Authority, was qualified to occupy either the left or right seat. In this flight, he occupied the right seat as the First Officer.
- Prior to the crew briefing, the First Officer was not aware of the captains unfamiliarity with the route from the departure airport to the destination airport. The captain disclosed his unfamiliarity with this route to the First Officer but F/O, in order to avoid any flight delay or passenger dissatisfaction, agreed to serve as First Officer and did not report wrong crew composition to the operation department.
- Given the reduced visibility near the runway, the First Officer was obliged, in the event of failure to sight an adequate landing area (Touchdown Zone) and occurrence of a long flaring, to instruct Go-Around and brief the captain accordingly.
Tower Controller
- Considering the prevailing weather conditions in the vicinity of Dushanbe International Airport, the air traffic control tower advised the cockpit crew of VRH6805 regarding the forecast of a thunderstorm accompanied by lightning at 1,000 feet above ground level within the airport vicinity.
- Based on information received from the Dushanbe Air Traffic Control unit, special weather warnings (SPECI) were issued before and after the aircrafts descent. In accordance with ICAO Document 4444, if a meteorological phenomenon poses a hazard to flight, the controller is obliged to inform the pilots. This notification was provided to VRH6805 at 06:07:31 UTC at an altitude of 8,300 feet.
- Given the runway surface contamination with water, the effective braking action of the runway was not communicated to the flight crew.
- The air traffic controller, despite visually observing the aircraft and its runway excursion, did not alert the ground safety units. This resulted in a delay in identifying the aircrafts off-runway safety condition.
- Ground services did not reach to the incident site on the suitable time against to the ICAO recommended procedures outlined in Document 9137.
Metars:
UTDD 100800Z 10003MPS 050V180 8000 -TSRA FEW025 BKN030CB BKN100 16/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100730Z 10005MPS 9999 TS BKN039CB BKN069 17/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100700Z 06002MPS 9999 VCTS FEW031 BKN042CB BKN048 17/15 Q1017 R09/29//50 TEMPO TS RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100630Z VRB02MPS 6000 -TSRA BKN049CB OVC082 16/13 Q1017 RESHRA R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100600Z VRB04G09MPS 1900 TSRA SCT044 BKN052CB OVC061 15/11 Q1017 R09/29//50 TEMPO 08009G14MPS RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100530Z VRB01MPS 9999 SCT044CB OVC057 19/13 Q1017 R09/19//60 TEMPO TS RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100500Z 17002MPS 9999 FEW054CB SCT054 19/13 Q1017 R09/19//60 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100430Z VRB02MPS 9999 SCT058 19/13 Q1017 R09/19//60 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100400Z VRB01MPS 9999 FEW066 18/13 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100330Z 00000MPS 5000 BR FEW066CB SCT130 16/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0925=
UTDD 100300Z 17002MPS 4400 BR FEW059CB BKN130 15/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100230Z 00000MPS 5000 BR SCT064CB BKN110 OVC130 14/13 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100200Z VRB02MPS 6000 FEW076CB BKN110 14/13 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
The aircraft after coming to a stop (Photo: IAAIB):
Map (Graphics: IAAIB):
Iran's AAIB reported the investigation was delegated to Iran, the occurrence was rated a serious incident. The pilot in command, an instructor, was occupying the right hand seat and was pilot monitoring, the captain in the left hand seat was pilot flying. The AAIB summarized the sequence of events:
On 06:05:28 UTC, after contacting Approach Radar Controller, the flight was cleared to initiate ILS approach for RWY 09. By commencing the ILS approach, the cockpit crew experienced raining on final and the tower controller reported weather condition including the thunderstorm in the vicinity of the airport as an unusual weather phenomenon, despite, the cockpit crew continued the approach and after receiving gusting wind information, was cleared for landing on 06:08:39 UTC.
Pilot report shows: During landing flare, the visibility became poor as the runway edge lights were difficult to see due to heavy precipitation so, the captain (PF) experienced a long flare on the runway inadvertently. After landing, the thrust reversers were activated and maximum manual braking applied by the captain but the runway distance remaining was not sufficient for stopping and finally aircraft overran the runway end and a Runway Excursion occurred and came to rest in a grass-covered and muddy area beyond the Runway End Safety Area (RESA) while the empennage section was on the paved surface.
The AAIB described the damage:
- Nose landing gear tire burst;
- Damage to the external cowling of No.2 engine;
- Minor damage to the right main landing gear and the air-ground switch system; and
- Interring of mud and objects into the engines, landing gears, and the intake of cabin air system.
On Sep 17th 2025 Iran's AAIB released their final report concluding the probable causes of the serious incident were:
Following a thorough review and analysis of factual information, the main cause of this serious incident was determined to be human factor, specifically the captains incorrect decision to continue the approach under adverse weather conditions and the misjudgment of the remaining runway length required to stop the aircraft.
Contributing Factors
- ineffective pilot planning in defining responsibilities within company operations.
- weak control methods in the companys operational manual regarding the
classification of airports.
- Presence of severe weather phenomena, including thunderstorms, lightning, and heavy rainfall in the area
The AAIB analysed:
Pre-flight Planning by the Airline
- The operational management of Varesh Airlines had designated Flight 6805 as a two-pilot operation; but the crew composition and division of duties were not in accordance with the companys operational procedures. The flight was scheduled with a Commander who had no prior experience on this route, which was inconsistent with the operational procedures for a first-time flight on this route.
For the incident flight, the companys scheduling manager should have assigned First Officer as instructor pilot, for supervising, evaluating, and training the Commander during his first operation on the TehranDushanbe route.
- The operational responsible staff of the Airlines did not inform or make the flights First Officer (instructor pilot) aware of the Commanders lack of experience and unfamiliarity with the route from Imam Khomeini International Airport (OIIE) to Dushanbe International Airport (UTDD).
- Based on the General Declaration (crew list), the name of the First Officer (instructor pilot) appears at the top of the crew roster, while the name of the flights Commander is listed as second one. In the Operation Flight Plan (OFP) documents and the Dispatch Release Form, the instructor pilot is designated as the aircraft commander, who should have assumed responsibility for the flight and signed the aforementioned documents. However, the operation Department of Varesh Airlines assigned the flight responsibility to a pilot inexperienced on this route, who then signed these documents, despite not having undergone a route proficiency check from the departure airport (OIIE) to the destination airport (UTDD) and therefore not being authorized for the route as the Commander. This misassignment reduced the effectiveness of crew resource management (CRM) between the two pilots.
- The pre-flight briefing is a critical opportunity for sharing knowledge and awareness of specific flight conditions, including the characteristics of the destination airport, among the flight crew. Considering that the flight crew had been transported individually from their residences to Imam Khomeini International Airport, and that the Pilot-in-Command arrived so later on a separate transfer from the other crew members, an effective pre-flight briefing between the pilots and cabin crew was not conducted. The briefing was limited to the bus and inside the aircraft, and the instructor pilot did not have sufficient opportunity to convey the relevant operational experience regarding the destination airport (CAT B) to the Pilot-in-Command.
- According to the definitions stated in section 1.13.1.2, Category B aerodromes, on page 41 of Varesh Airlines Operations Manual (OM, Chapter One, Part C), the flight captain had not, prior to the flight on 9 April 2025, completed any route and aerodrome familiarization training for the route from the departure airport to the destination airport. Furthermore, he had not undergone a flight assessment by a Type Rating Instructor (TRI), and consequently, no training record had been issued.
- One of the key aspects of maintaining safety is ensuring the full readiness of pilots to operate flights to different airports, each with unique characteristics and complexities. Since Category B aerodromes have unusual features or complexities that require greater pilot awareness and preparation, the companys operational procedures specify that relying solely on self-study for a pilot flying to such airports for the first time, especially in the role of PIC, poses a safety risk.
Flight Commander & Pilot Flying
- Prior to the flight on 10 April 2025, the commander had never flown the route. The captain had been informed and aware of the flight schedule prior to 10 April 2025; however, he did not report his unfitness to accept the responsibility as Pilot-in-Command to any of Varesh Airlines responsible.
- Despite adverse meteorological conditions reported by the destination tower on forecast thunderstorms and lightning in the airport vicinity, and the TAF predicting cumulonimbus clouds, gusty winds of 1424 knots, and heavy rainfall, the commander continued the approach instead of initiating a missed approach. Pilot statements confirmed that the severe weather caused reduced visibility on final approach, delaying runway acquisition.
- Due to the gusty wind, the commander increased the approach speed by 10 knots above the computed approach speed plus the standard gust correction (VREF + 5 + 10 knots). Encountering non-standard weather phenomena, the commander had inadequate visibility of the runway threshold and edge lights, but still continued the landing attempt. After crossing the runway threshold, the aircraft experienced a long flare, consuming over half of the runway before touchdown. After passing taxiway D on a wet runway, despite both pilots applying maximum braking, the aircraft was unable to stop and overran the runway, coming to rest in a grass- and mud-covered area beyond the end of the strip.
- In accordance with the aircrafts Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the autothrottle should be disengaged 12 NM from the runway or at 300600 feet AGL to permit manual thrust control during landing. In this event, the commander failed to disengage the autothrottle until touchdown.
Note: When a manual landing is planned from an approach with the autopilot engaged, the transition to manual flight should be planned early enough to allow the pilot time to establish airplane control before beginning the flare.
- If the pilot, due to reduced visibility caused by meteorological conditions, is unable to identify the runway edge lightswhich indicate the longitudinal and lateral limits of the runway at night and particularly in low visibilityor other runway visual aids, this reflects an unsafe level of visibility for continuing the landing. The most important pilot action in case of loss of visual reference during the final stages of approach is to execute a Go-Around, which was not performed by the pilot. The pilots justification was limited to not having encountered adverse meteorological phenomena and attributing the approach limitations solely to natural obstacles after a potential go-around.
First Officer (F/O) and Type Rating Instructor (TRI)
- The flights First Officer, holding a Boeing 737 Type Rating Instructor (TRI) certificate No. FCL.905.TRI (a), (d, 1, 2) dated 13 March 2025, issued by IR Iran Civil Aviation Authority, was qualified to occupy either the left or right seat. In this flight, he occupied the right seat as the First Officer.
- Prior to the crew briefing, the First Officer was not aware of the captains unfamiliarity with the route from the departure airport to the destination airport. The captain disclosed his unfamiliarity with this route to the First Officer but F/O, in order to avoid any flight delay or passenger dissatisfaction, agreed to serve as First Officer and did not report wrong crew composition to the operation department.
- Given the reduced visibility near the runway, the First Officer was obliged, in the event of failure to sight an adequate landing area (Touchdown Zone) and occurrence of a long flaring, to instruct Go-Around and brief the captain accordingly.
Tower Controller
- Considering the prevailing weather conditions in the vicinity of Dushanbe International Airport, the air traffic control tower advised the cockpit crew of VRH6805 regarding the forecast of a thunderstorm accompanied by lightning at 1,000 feet above ground level within the airport vicinity.
- Based on information received from the Dushanbe Air Traffic Control unit, special weather warnings (SPECI) were issued before and after the aircrafts descent. In accordance with ICAO Document 4444, if a meteorological phenomenon poses a hazard to flight, the controller is obliged to inform the pilots. This notification was provided to VRH6805 at 06:07:31 UTC at an altitude of 8,300 feet.
- Given the runway surface contamination with water, the effective braking action of the runway was not communicated to the flight crew.
- The air traffic controller, despite visually observing the aircraft and its runway excursion, did not alert the ground safety units. This resulted in a delay in identifying the aircrafts off-runway safety condition.
- Ground services did not reach to the incident site on the suitable time against to the ICAO recommended procedures outlined in Document 9137.
Metars:
UTDD 100800Z 10003MPS 050V180 8000 -TSRA FEW025 BKN030CB BKN100 16/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100730Z 10005MPS 9999 TS BKN039CB BKN069 17/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100700Z 06002MPS 9999 VCTS FEW031 BKN042CB BKN048 17/15 Q1017 R09/29//50 TEMPO TS RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100630Z VRB02MPS 6000 -TSRA BKN049CB OVC082 16/13 Q1017 RESHRA R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100600Z VRB04G09MPS 1900 TSRA SCT044 BKN052CB OVC061 15/11 Q1017 R09/29//50 TEMPO 08009G14MPS RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100530Z VRB01MPS 9999 SCT044CB OVC057 19/13 Q1017 R09/19//60 TEMPO TS RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100500Z 17002MPS 9999 FEW054CB SCT054 19/13 Q1017 R09/19//60 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100430Z VRB02MPS 9999 SCT058 19/13 Q1017 R09/19//60 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100400Z VRB01MPS 9999 FEW066 18/13 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100330Z 00000MPS 5000 BR FEW066CB SCT130 16/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0925=
UTDD 100300Z 17002MPS 4400 BR FEW059CB BKN130 15/14 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100230Z 00000MPS 5000 BR SCT064CB BKN110 OVC130 14/13 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
UTDD 100200Z VRB02MPS 6000 FEW076CB BKN110 14/13 Q1017 R09/29//50 NOSIG RMK QFE694/0926=
The aircraft after coming to a stop (Photo: IAAIB):
Map (Graphics: IAAIB):
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